the whole story, but it was chosen as a preliminary first step to outline parameters of discovery and as being the most economical means available to plaintiff. We think in these circumstances plaintiff was entitled to insist on his interrogatories being answered and that they should not have been dismissed by the trial judge as oppressive.

It may be that plaintiff would now be well advised, given the totality of discovery, irregular as it may be, which he has been afforded, to proceed with depositions or a court hearing.[7] Certainly plaintiff later must do so. Although the choice of discovery methods is normally up to the litigant, we cannot cast all the blame on the Government defendants here. Part of the reason for plaintiff obtaining unsatisfactory responses undoubtedly lies in the fact that plaintiff has been addressing inquiries only to the opposing parties, who by this date in history are nothing but file custodians with no personal knowledge of the matters in issue.

The data which plaintiff seeks to have produced, if it exists, are matters of interest not only to him but to the nation. Surely their existence or nonexistence should be determined speedily on the basis of the best available evidence, *i.e.*, the witnesses who had personal knowledge of events at the time the investigation was made. This cannot be done by interrogatories addressed to a party, although this might serve to narrow the scope of inquiry. It must be done with live witnesses either by deposition or in court.

Decades ago Dean Wigmore said that cross-examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever

[7] While we think the trial judge should not have quashed the interrogatories *in toto* as "oppressive," we do not rule out a detailed evaluation of individual questions, if plaintiff renews them and the trial judge so desires, given the discovery plaintiff has already received.

invented for the discovery of truth."[8] We think it t for the trial court to start the engine running, and the after make detailed findings as to what the eviden adduced establishes. Accordingly, we remand this ca to the District Court for further proceedings under t Freedom of Information Act not inconsistent with th opinion.

So order

[8] 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn 1974).